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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
                     
 
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 
 The issue presented is whether § 204(g) of the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1054(g), 
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requires an employer that sells a business but retains the 
pension plan covering the employees of that business to credit 
service with the purchaser when determining the eligibility of 
those employees for an early retirement benefit subsidy. 
Plaintiffs James Dade, Jerome Budde, Jr., and the class they 
purport to represent sued to force the North American Philips 
Corporation ("Philips"), their former employer, to comply with 
this alleged requirement.  The district court held that ERISA 
does not impose such a requirement and dismissed the claims of 
plaintiffs for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 
12(b)(6).  We will affirm. 
 
I. 
 This dispute arises in connection with Philips' sale of 
the assets of its Magnavox Electronic Systems Company 
("Magnavox") division to MESC Electronics Systems, Inc. 
("MESCESI").  The relevant facts are not in dispute.  Plaintiffs 
were employed by Magnavox on October 22, 1993, when the sale 
closed.  Until the sale, plaintiffs participated in the Philips 
Electronics North America Corporation Pension Plan for Salaried 
Employees (the "Philips Plan" or the "Plan"). 
 Under the terms of the Plan, sixty-five is the normal 
retirement age.  However, participants who are at least fifty-
five years old can elect to retire earlier.  Such early retirees 
receive benefits reduced by 0.3% for each month their retirement 
precedes the normal retirement age.  Under the Plan's "Rule of 
85," early retirement benefits will not be reduced if the sum of 
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the participant's age and years of eligible service at retirement 
is at least eighty-five.  The Plan defines eligible service as 
service with Philips, an affiliate of Philips, or any other 
company that has adopted the Plan.   
 Philips notified the plaintiffs of the impending sale 
of Magnavox and of the sale's effects on their retirement 
benefits.  After the sale, Philips would remain the sponsor of 
the Plan and there would be no transfer of Plan assets or 
liabilities.  While the plaintiffs would cease to be Philips' 
employees at the time of the closing, they would retain their 
rights under the Plan.  Moreover, the Plan would be amended in 
two respects.  All participants' accrued retirement benefits 
would become 100% vested when the sale closed and Magnavox 
employees continuing with MESCESI would be entitled to credit for 
up to one year of additional service with MESCESI towards the 
Philips Plan's Rule of 85 requirements.  No credit would be given 
for any subsequent service with MESCESI.   
 After the sale, the plaintiffs continued to work for 
MESCESI in the same jobs they held with Magnavox.  They did not 
satisfy the Rule of 85 requirements when the sale closed, nor 
could they do so even with credit for an additional year of 
service with MESCESI.  Plaintiff Budde's age and eligible service 
summed to eighty-five, but he was not yet fifty-five years old, 
and would not turn fifty-five by October 1994.  Plaintiff Dade 
did not have sufficient eligible service. 
   
II. 
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 The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.  
§ 1331 and 29 U.S.C. § 1132.  Our jurisdiction over this appeal 
rests on 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review over the 
district court's order dismissing plaintiffs' complaint under 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).  Moore v. Tartler, 986 F.2d 682, 685 
(3d Cir. 1993). 
 
III. 
 Plaintiffs' complaint asserts that both ERISA and the 
terms of the Plan require Philips to give plaintiffs credit for 
all of their service with MESCESI for the purpose of satisfying 
the Rule of 85.  The district court was correct in holding that 
neither ERISA nor the terms of the Plan require that Philips give 
this credit. 
 
A.  The Plan 
 While plaintiffs insist that Philips breached the Plan, 
their supporting argument before us rests squarely on two 
provisions of the Plan that incorporate the "applicable law": 
Section 4.2.3, which requires the Plan to give credit for service 
with a successor employer "to the extent required by law," and 
Section 13.4, which authorizes amendments to the Plan in order to 
"comply with any other provision of applicable law."  Since the 
"applicable law" to which plaintiffs point is § 204(g) of ERISA, 
it necessarily follows that the sole issue presented in this 
appeal is whether § 204(g) requires credit for the plaintiffs' 
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service with MESCESI.  It is nevertheless important to view the 
statutory issue in the context of the provisions of the Plan. 
 The unambiguous terms of the Plan do not require Rule 
of 85 credit for service with MESCESI.  Section 5.7 of the Plan 
sets out the terms for early retirement subsidies.  A 
participant's right to an early retirement subsidy is based on 
the participant's age and years of "Eligibility Service." 
"Eligibility Service" is defined as the "number of years and 
months of employees' Periods of Service."  "Period of Service" is 
in turn defined as the period running from an employee's 
"Employment Commencement Date" (defined in Section 1.2.25 as the 
day on which he performs his first hour of paid work for an 
Employer or Affiliate) through an applicable "Severance Date." 
Finally, "Severance Date" is defined for relevant purposes as the 
"earliest of:  the date on which an employee quits, retires, is 
discharged or dies; or the first anniversary of the first date of 
a period in which an employee remains absent from service (with 
or without pay) with an Employer or Affiliate for any [other] 
reason."  Plan § 1.2.53 (A. 57).  The Plan defines "Employer" as 
Philips or any other entity that has adopted the Plan with the 
approval of the Pension Committee, § 1.2.24 (A. 45), and 
"Affiliate" as an entity owned by or part of the controlled group 
of an Employer.  § 1.2.3 (A. 38).  MESCESI has not adopted the 
Plan and is not an affiliate of Philips.   
 Section 4.2.3 expressly excludes from the definition of 
"Period of Service" time spent working for any entity that is not 
yet or is no longer an Employer or Affiliate: 
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In no event shall a Period of Service include 
any period of service with a corporation or 
other entity (a) prior to the date it became 
an Employer (or the date it became an 
Affiliate, if earlier) or (b) after it ceases 
to be an Employer or Affiliate except to the 
extent required by law, or to the extent 
determined by the Pension Committee in its 
discretion exercised in a manner that does 
not discriminate in favor of highly paid 
employees. 
(A. 73.)  Since the parties agree that the Pension Committee did 
not exercise its discretion to credit service with MESCESI after 
the first year, we turn to the effect of § 204(g) of ERISA. 
 
B.  The Requirements of ERISA 
 ERISA does not mandate the creation of pension plans. 
Nor, with exceptions not here relevant, does it dictate the 
benefits to be afforded once a decision is made to create one. 
Hlinka v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 863 F.2d 279, 283 (3d Cir. 
1988); see also H.R. Rep. No. 807, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted 
in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4670, 4677.  "ERISA is not a direction to 
employers as to what benefits to grant their employees."  Hlinka, 
863 F.2d at 283.  Philips was thus at liberty to define the early 
retirement benefit in any way it chose, including a stipulation 
that only service to Philips or an affiliate would be credited 
towards the Rule of 85 requirement.  Plaintiffs do not contend 
otherwise.  Accordingly, we are required to enforce the Plan as 
written unless we can find a provision of ERISA that contains a 
contrary directive.  The only candidate identified by the 
plaintiffs is § 204(g). 
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 Section 204(g) of ERISA prohibits an employer from 
decreasing a participant's accrued benefits by plan amendment. 
Prior to 1984, no protection was given to early retirement 
benefits because they were not considered to be accrued benefits. 
Bencivenga v. Western Pa. Teamsters and Employers Pension Fund, 
763 F.2d 574, 577 (3d Cir. 1985).  In 1984, however, Congress 
amended ERISA § 204(g) to provide protection for early retirement 
benefits.  Retirement Equity Act of 1984 ("REA"), Pub. L. No. 98-
397, § 301(a)(2), 98 Stat. 1450-51.  Section 204(g) as amended 
provides in relevant part: 
 (1) The accrued benefit of a participant 
under a plan may not be decreased by an 
amendment of the plan . . . . 
 (2) For purposes of paragraph (1), a 
plan amendment which has the effect of-- 
 (A)  eliminating or 
reducing an early retirement 
benefit or a retirement-type 
subsidy (as defined in regulations) 
. . .  
with respect to benefits attributable to 
service before the amendment shall be treated 
as reducing accrued benefits.  In the case of 
a retirement-type subsidy, the preceding 
sentence shall apply only with respect to a 
participant who satisfies (either before or 
after the amendment) the preamendment 
conditions for the subsidy. . . .1 
After 1984, a plan sponsor could prospectively eliminate an early 
retirement benefit by amendment, but under § 204(g) the amendment 
could not adversely affect the early retirement benefit of a plan 
                                                           
1
  Rule of 85 benefits are considered early retirement subsidies 
because "more is provided . . . than any reasonable actuarial 
equivalent of the plan's normal retirement benefit."  Stephen R. 
Bruce, Pension Claims Rights and Obligations, 285 (1993); see 
Ashenbaugh v. Crucible, Inc., 854 F.2d 1516, 1521 n.6, 1528 n.12 
(3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1105 (1989). 
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participant who satisfied the pre-amendment conditions for the 
benefit either before or after the amendment.  Thus, if Philips 
had adopted such an amendment, it would have had to allow those 
employees who remained in its employ after the amendment to "grow 
into" the benefit by providing post-amendment service to Philips 
or an affiliate of Philips.    
 Section 204(g) is not applicable under the facts of 
this case because there has been no amendment of the Plan that 
reduced a benefit, accrued or otherwise.  The only amendment to 
the Plan was one increasing the early retirement benefit by 
expanding the universe of participants who could qualify for it. 
While plaintiffs insist that Philips' stated position, denying 
early retirement benefits to Dade, Budde and the others is 
"tantamount to an amendment of the plan,"  Appellants' brief at 
19, that is simply not the case.  Philips' stated position was 
nothing more than an accurate recounting of the Plan's terms. The 
denial resulted from the fact that plaintiffs could not satisfy 
the preamendment, pre-sale conditions for the Rule of 85 
retirement-type subsidy as originally written.   
 In arguing that § 204(g) requires Philips to credit 
plaintiffs for service with MESCESI, plaintiffs ignore the fact 
that the REA does not override the conditions originally imposed 
by the Plan which defined the early retirement benefits when they 
were created.  As this court has explained, "the fact that 
[amendments reducing early retirement benefits] will now be 
'treated as reducing accrued benefits' does not mean that 
Congress intends to foreclose employers from circumscribing the 
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availability of such optional benefits when they are being 
created."  Ashenbaugh, 854 F.2d at 1527.  "Congress's chief 
purpose in enacting [ERISA] was to ensure that workers receive 
promised pension benefits upon retirement," Hoover, 756 F.2d at 
985 (emphasis added).  Thus, Congress sought "to protect 
contractually defined benefits."  Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 
489 U.S. at 113 (emphasis added).  The early retirement benefits 
plaintiffs seek were neither promised nor contractually defined. 
   This case is not controlled by Gillis v. Hoechst 
Celanese Corp., 4 F.3d 1137 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. 
Ct. 1540 (1994), the principal authority relied upon by 
plaintiffs.  In Gillis, we held that §§ 208 and 204(g) required a 
greater transfer of plan assets in a plan spin-off accompanying a 
sale of a business than the selling sponsor had agreed to make. 
Neither of those sections is applicable here.   
 The facts of Gillis were similar to those of the 
present case in some respects:  both cases involved the sale of a 
business by the plan sponsor, both plans offered similar Rule of 
85 early retirement benefits, the plaintiffs in both cases had 
not satisfied the Rule of 85 at the time of the sales, and both 
plans only credited service with the plan sponsor.  Id. at 1140, 
1143.  Gillis, however, differs materially from the present case. 
In Gillis, the original plan sponsor transferred all of the 
plan's liabilities and assets to the purchaser.  In the 
vernacular of the trade, there was a plan spin-off.  Moreover, 
the purchaser agreed to provide all of the same early retirement 
benefits as the previous plan.  There was no dispute about 
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whether the plaintiffs, following the spin-off, would be entitled 
to credit for service with the new employer.  They would be.  Id. 
at 1149 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 The issue in Gillis was whether the original plan 
sponsor had transferred sufficient assets to satisfy the 
requirements of § 208.  Gillis, 4 F.3d at 1143.  Section 208 
provides: 
 A pension plan may not merge or 
consolidate with, or transfer its assets or 
liabilities to, any other plan . . . , unless 
each participant in the plan would (if the 
plan then terminated) receive a benefit 
immediately after the merger, consolidation, 
or transfer which is equal to or greater than 
the benefit he would have been entitled to 
receive immediately before the merger, 
consolidation, or transfer (if the plan had 
then terminated) . . . . 
 
29 U.S.C. § 1058.  Thus, a plan spin-off is permissible only if 
the participants would receive no less on a hypothetical 
termination of the plan just after the spin-off than they would 
have received on a hypothetical termination just before the spin-
off.   
 Accordingly, application of § 208 to the facts in 
Gillis required the court to determine what benefits the 
participants would have received in a termination at two points 
in time.  This necessarily implicated § 204(g) since a 
termination of the plan would have had the same effect as an 
amendment eliminating all benefits.2  The court held that the 
                                                           
2
  Not surprisingly, the legislative history of the 1984 
amendments indicates that Congress intended early retirement 
benefits to have the same protection in a plan termination that 
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combined effect of §§ 208 and 204(g) in the context of a plan 
spin-off like that before it was to require the transfer of an 
amount of assets that would include sufficient funding for the 
early retirement benefits for those who would qualify after the 
transfer by service to the new employer.   
 Section 208 is not relevant here because this case does 
not involve a plan spin-off.  Section 204(g) is not applicable 
here because this case does not involve anything that can fairly 
be considered a plan amendment eliminating or reducing an early 
retirement benefit.  With the exception of the amendment 
enhancing the early retirement benefit, the Philips Plan was 
precisely the same before and after the sale.  The holding in 
Gillis is, accordingly, inapposite here. 
 While we acknowledge that portions of the opinion of 
the court in Gillis can plausibly be read as inconsistent with 
the conclusion that we here reach, we do not so read them.  In 
any case, we are required to harmonize the holding of Gillis with 
the holdings of our prior opinions that a sponsoring employer, 
with exceptions not here relevant, is free to define the benefits 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
they would have in an amendment.  See, e.g., S. Rep. 575, 98th 
Cong. 2d Sess., reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2547, 2575 
("Terminated Plans:  The bill does not provide an exception to 
the prohibition against reduction of benefits or elimination of 
benefit options in the case of a terminated plan.  Accordingly, a 
plan is not to be considered to have satisfied all of its 
liabilities to participants and beneficiaries until it has 
provided for the payment of contingent liabilities with respect 
to a participant who, after the date of the termination of a 
plan, meets the requirements for a subsidized benefit.").  As 
Judge Alito noted in his concurring opinion in Gillis, the 
Internal Revenue Service has taken the position that the 
protection of § 204(g) applies in a plan termination. 
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in its ERISA plan and that those definitions must be enforced as 
written in the absence of a contrary statutory mandate.  As we 
have explained, the result in Gillis is attributable to the 
requirements of §§ 208 and 204(g).  Neither those sections nor 
any other provision of ERISA authorizes us to depart from the 
terms of Philips' Plan in the circumstances of this case. 
 The result that we here reach is consistent with that 
reached in Hunger v. AB, et al., 12 F.3d 118 (8th Cir. 1993), on 
virtually identical facts. 
 
IV. 
 The judgment of the district court will be affirmed. 
